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INTRODUCTION 
Assisted reproductive technology (ART) has made great strides in furthering 
many Americans’ dreams of becoming parents. The law has come to fully embrace 
ART in many of its forms—particularly when it comes to a married couple’s use of 
a technology like in vitro fertilization (IVF).1 Even more morally and ethically 
controversial forms of ART have gained sway. Surrogacy arrangements, not so 
long ago relegated to the black market, are now recognized as valid and are legally 
enforceable in more than a dozen states.2 Some traditionally conservative states, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. The author is currently 
Reporter of the Surrogacy Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, a group charged 
with the task of rewriting and modernizing Louisiana’s scheme of surrogacy regulation. 
Thanks are due to Jody Madeira and the participants in the 2012 Roundtable on Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, particularly Kimberly Mutcherson and Radhika Rao, for their 
excellent comments and criticism, along with LSU Law for its continuing and generous 
support of my research on family formation through adoption and assisted reproduction. 
Andrew Lambert (LSU Law Class of 2013) provided excellent research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(B)(1)(a)(viii) (2012) (recognizing the 
intended parents of a child born through surrogacy to be the parents for purposes of the birth 
certificate); id § 40:32 (requiring that those intended parents be married). See generally Ann 
MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem? 
The Married-Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception 
Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1991) (discussing the marriage requirement and 
potential constitutional issues that might arise). 
 2. See Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for 
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2258–60 (2012) (categorizing states that either 
permit, regulate, or ban “commercial” and/or “altruistic” surrogacy contracts). 
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such as Louisiana, are wrestling even today with drafting laws to sanction 
surrogacy in a limited form.3 Thousands of families are said to have created 
families through surrogacy last year alone.4 
The law’s evolution in accepting these modern families is laudable, but there is 
much work left to be done. State laws relating to surrogacy frequently continue to 
perpetuate discrimination based on marital status. In the relatively small number of 
states that do sanction some form of surrogacy, state law will often recognize and 
enforce a surrogacy arrangement only when the intended parents are married.5 The 
result of this marriage requirement is a body of American surrogacy law that 
frequently suffers from serious constitutional defects. The Constitution permits 
some disparate treatment of groups, but discrimination based on marital status in a 
fundamental matter such as family formation fails to satisfy constitutional 
standards and must not be tolerated.6 
This Article seeks to push states that open the door to surrogacy as a permissible 
reproductive avenue to begin affording the right to married and unmarried intended 
parents alike. Narrowly tailoring rules that recognize the practical realities of the 
widespread use of surrogacy arrangements is necessary to eliminate 
unconstitutional treatment of all the actors involved in the surrogacy process. 
Part I of the Article will describe America’s history with surrogacy as a 
reproductive technology and detail the current regulatory scheme. From Baby M7 to 
a wider acceptance of gestational surrogacy, the last thirty years have brought about 
a serious evolution in societal and legal views on surrogacy. Part II will detail state-
sanctioned discrimination in surrogacy, focusing particularly on marital status-
based discrimination. Part III will consider the scrutiny that should obtain when 
surrogacy regulations come under constitutional attack. The appropriate level of 
scrutiny in this area is woefully indeterminate, leaving courts, scholars, and 
litigants alike stuck in a morass of uncertainty. Finally, Part IV will demonstrate 
that even those American states that have progressively sanctioned some form of 
surrogacy have occasionally done so unconstitutionally. Regimes with a marriage 
requirement are scrutinized on equal protection grounds and are shown to fall short 
of what is constitutionally required. 
Limitations on the use of surrogacy in this country abound, in part because 
Americans simply have not fully embraced the notion excoriated thirty years ago as 
the “rental of the womb.”8 The technology is within our hands.9 Attitudes about the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 81, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) (calling for a 
reevaluation and revision of Louisiana surrogacy rules in light of national trends toward 
sanctioning gestational surrogacy and the evolution of reproductive technology since the last 
legislative modification to Louisiana surrogacy rules). 
 4. See Nara Schoenberg, Born in the USA, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2011, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-04-13/health/ct-news-surrogate-mom-20110413_1_
surrogacy-center-for-surrogate-parenting-international-parents; see also Helene S. Shapo, 
Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 465, 465 (2006). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 7. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 8. See, e.g., Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally Their Bun”: The Power 
2013] DISCRIMINATION IN SURROGACY 1189 
 
legitimacy of families created in nontraditional ways have undergone a necessary 
and profound change.10 But still, Americans find “something profoundly 
frightening” in the use of ART11—especially surrogacy. ART has come a long way 
in the last several decades.12 I argue here that the progress we have made is 
laudable, but we must evolve more quickly to recognize the realities of surrogacy, 
to eradicate unconstitutional treatment of intended parents, and to bring American 
treatment of surrogacy into line with what the Constitution has protected for 
centuries. 
I. THE UNITED STATES’ EXPERIENCE WITH SURROGACY 
Surrogacy appeared on the national radar in America around 1988, when 
America wept with the families involved in the “Baby M” case.13 There, William 
and Elizabeth Stern, a wealthy biochemist and doctor, sought to have a biological 
child.14 Because Mrs. Stern had been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, however, 
she feared that pregnancy might cause a significant and life-threatening aggravation 
of her condition.15 The Sterns, therefore, sought out a surrogate who would help 
them in return for compensation.16 And they rather quickly found one. Mary Beth 
Whitehead, a former employee of a bar and a go-go dancer,17 with a husband who 
worked in sanitation, agreed to carry a child to term for the Sterns for the sum of 
$10,000.18 The parties contracted, in advance, that Mary Beth Whitehead would be 
inseminated with William Stern’s sperm, gestate any resulting child, and relinquish 
all rights to the child to the Sterns upon the child’s birth.19 All apparently went 
                                                                                                                 
and Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy 
Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
159, 184 (2011); Flavia Berys, Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How 
California Courts Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 
CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 322 (2006); Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Note, Womb for Rent: The Future of 
International Trade in Surrogacy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 343 (1997). 
 9. See JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 36 (2006) 
(describing the development of reproductive technologies). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 11. See, e.g., Gilbert Meilaender, Products of the Will: Robertson’s Children of Choice, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 185 (1995) (quoting JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF 
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (1994) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 12. See DAAR, supra note 9, at 25–37.  
 13. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 14. Id. at 1249; see also Kurt Heine, A Bitter Summary of Surrogacy’s Pitfalls, PHILA. 
DAILY NEWS, March 13, 1987, at 04. 
 15. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235. 
 16. See id. at 1236. 
 17. See Mike Kelly, 25 Years After Baby M, REC., March 30, 2012, at A01; Adrian Lee, 
‘She Knows Who I Am’ Baby M Case Mocks Warmth of Motherhood, PHILLY.COM (March 
19, 1987), http://articles.philly.com/1987-03-19/news/26222097_1_sterns-surrogate-mother-
judge-harvey-r-sorkow. 
 18. See Lee, supra note 17; see also Heine, supra note 14. 
 19. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235. 
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according to plan, until the child was born.20 Mary Beth Whitehead took one look 
at the baby and changed her mind.21 She could not bring herself to relinquish to the 
Sterns the child she considered her daughter. She refused22 the $10,000 and told the 
Sterns of her intent not to honor their contract.23 The Sterns, of course, sought 
enforcement of the bargain they had made with Mary Beth Whitehead—an 
agreement to allow them to rear a child that was biologically Mr. Stern’s—in the 
state of its making, New Jersey.24 Fearful that the contract would be enforced in a 
manner that deprived her of rights to her genetic child, Mary Beth Whitehead fled 
to Florida with the child as the nation looked on in awe and horror.25 
A multistate custody battle began—one that would last years, cost tens of 
thousands of dollars, and expose just how out-of-touch and deficient American 
surrogacy rules––or the lack thereof––were in the 1980s.26 In the end, the Sterns 
were awarded custody of Baby M, with rights of visitation recognized in Mary 
Beth Whitehead because of her role as genetic mother (and surrogate).27 
The true contribution of Baby M lies not so much in its holding. Indeed, the 
court’s ultimate conclusion that surrogacy agreements must not be enforced is of 
questionable utility in modern times.28 The Baby M court rejected surrogacy, at 
least in part, because in the case before it the surrogate contributed genetic material 
to the child’s creation.29 Enforcing the surrogacy contract would, therefore, have 
forced a genetic mother to comply with an agreement she made, in advance of a 
child’s birth—at perhaps an economically vulnerable time—to relinquish her own 
child.30 In other words, Baby M makes sense as a traditional surrogacy case. 
These days, however, most surrogacy arrangements are gestational.31 The same 
risks and societal concerns do not necessarily arise in this alternate form of 
surrogacy. In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate merely acts as a carrier for the 
child.32 Her role is gestational in nature, and, by definition, she is not genetically 
related to the child she gestates, who is the genetic child of the intended parents.33 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See id. at 1236; see also Carolyn Acker, Surrogate Cried ‘Hysterically’ After Baby 
Left, Husband Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 8, 1987, at B05. 
 21. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236; see also Acker, supra note 20. 
 22. Acker, supra note 20; Carolyn Acker, Whitehead Says She’ll Fight Till End for Baby 
M, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 3, 1987, at A01. 
 23. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id.; see also Barbara Beck, Baby M’s Mother Gives Birth to Book Hires Surrogate 
Writer to Help Tell-All, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, March 8, 1989, at 41 (referring to Mary Beth 
Whitehead as the “world’s most notorious surrogate mother”); Heine, supra note 14. 
 26. See Heine, supra note 14; Joseph F. Sullivan, Lawyer and Guardian Ask for Fees for 
Baby M Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1987, at B2. 
 27. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1259–64. 
 28. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) 
(distinguishing gestational surrogacy agreements from the more abhorred agreements to 
engage in traditional surrogacy). 
 29. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246–51. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See Symposium: Panel 1, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 934, 939 (2011). 
 32. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY § 5.1–.3 (2d. ed. 2011). 
 33. Id. It is possible, of course, that the child resulting from gestational surrogacy not be 
genetically related to the intended parents either—in the case of use of donor gametes. Such 
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Baby M likely did not speak to gestational surrogacy. While the decision 
prohibits the use of surrogacy agreements in rather sweeping language, one of its 
central rationales is the impropriety of forcing a woman to relinquish her genetic 
child for pay.34 In a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate does not have any genetic 
connection to the child, making the relinquishment bargain she makes less 
offensive.35 More importantly, and more pragmatically, one can be reasonably 
confident that the Baby M court did not intend to speak to matters of gestational 
surrogacy, simply because the technology on which gestational surrogacy depends 
either didn’t exist, or was in stages of infancy, at the time Baby M was decided in 
1988. Gestational surrogacy relies on the use of in vitro fertilization, a reproductive 
technology that was first successfully employed in the United States in 1981.36 
Baby M’s lessons should, therefore, be interpreted narrowly, as limited to 
traditional surrogacy. 
Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that much of Baby M’s rationale extends 
to gestational surrogacy as well. One of the traditional concerns about upholding 
surrogacy is governmental acceptance of the “renting of the womb.”37 Essentially, 
the fear is that surrogacy will be used to exploit women in weaker socioeconomic 
classes, commodifying both their bodies and the reproductive process.38 Some 
suggest that concern should compel the law to act to ban all forms of surrogacy, or 
at least all compensated forms.39 
In the wake of Baby M, many state legislatures did precisely that. Today, seven 
states and the District of Columbia have clear legislative bans on both traditional 
and gestational surrogacy.40 Still four more states prohibit all forms of surrogacy by 
judicial decision.41 
                                                                                                                 
a relationship is still considered to be a “gestational” rather than a “genetic” surrogacy, 
however, the critical feature of the former being only that the surrogate is not genetically 
related to the child. See id. 
 34. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246 (noting the surrogacy’s invalidity stems from the 
“basic premise[] that the natural parents can decide in advance of birth which one is to have 
custody of the child,” which contravenes the policy that the child’s best interests should 
determine custody); id. at 1246–47 (stating that the state’s ultimate goal is that “children 
should remain with and be brought up by both of their natural parents” and “that the rights of 
natural parents are equal concerning their child, the father's right no greater than the 
mother’s”); id. at 1248 (describing “the strength of [a mother’s] bond with her child”). 
 35. See, e.g., Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York 
Should Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 373 (2011) 
(arguing that New York, specifically, should amend its laws to allow for gestational 
surrogacy rather than traditional surrogacy because of the inherent differences in the 
procedures, namely that the surrogate is unrelated to the fetus in gestational surrogacy). 
 36. See Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/babies/2/; see also Walter Sullivan, ‘Test-Tube’ 
Baby Born in U.S., Joining Successes Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29 1981, at C1. 
 37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding Against the 
Oppression of Surrogacy, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 35, 51–54 (1993). 
 39. Id. at 35. 
 40. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (2007) (“No person may enter into, induce, 
arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract.”); 
D.C. CODE § 16-402(a) (2001) (“Surrogate parenting contracts are prohibited and rendered 
unenforceable in the District.”); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9-2-126 to -127, 31-20-1-1 to -3 
1192 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1187 
 
The last ten years, however, have brought a slight change in tide toward fuller 
American acceptance of multiple forms of assisted reproductive technologies, 
including surrogacy.42 As of the year 2000, even the Uniform Parentage Act 
approves of the use of gestational surrogacy,43 a procreative method it refused to 
recognize as advisable ten years earlier.44 And to date, nearly a dozen states have 
passed legislation that sanctions some form of surrogacy, most frequently in its 
gestational and uncompensated form.45 
Nonetheless, surrogacy is still underaccepted in this country, particularly 
compared with our international peers.46 Indeed, scientists are said to be close to 
perfecting uterine transplants, a process they say is exciting because it will prevent 
infertile women from being forced to resort to surrogacy.47 
                                                                                                                 
(LexisNexis 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (2005) (“A contract for surrogate 
motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as 
contrary to public policy.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (2011) (“A surrogate 
parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-21,200 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010) 
(“Surrogate parenting contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, 
and are void and unenforceable.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2009) (“Any agreement in 
which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish that woman's rights and duties 
as parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is void.”); see also KINDREGAN & 
MCBRIEN, supra note 32, § 5.4. This number is both confusing and, perhaps, deceptive. 
States enact various statutes but they are occasionally held unenforceable by the state’s 
courts under constitutional guarantees; for an example, see id. § 5.4, at 159–60, for a 
discussion of Arizona’s statutory ban on surrogacy and the state court’s judgment holding 
that the statute violates equal protection. For an alternate discussion of states allowing or 
banning surrogacy, see Mortazavi, supra note 2, at 2258–62. 
 41. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 32, § 5.4. This number is as equally 
troublesome due to different courts within the same state issuing varying judgments on 
traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy. For an alternate discussion of key state 
jurisprudence, see Mortazavi, supra note 2, at 2258–62. 
 42. See Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ 
(describing a doubling in the use of ART over the course of the last decade). 
 43. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (amended 2002), 9B U.LA. 362 (2001 & Supp. 
2012). 
 44. Compare id., with UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 2, 9C 
U.L.A. 122 (2001). 
 45. See Mortazavi, supra note 2, at 2258–70 (canvassing the patchwork approach to 
surrogacy among the fifty states: statutory, jurisprudential, and absent laws). 
 46. See id. at 2270–71 (noting that certain countries allow altruistic surrogacy—namely 
Brazil, Greece, Holland, Israel, South Africa, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom). 
Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine allow both altruistic and commercial surrogacy. See id. at 
2272. India’s lack of regulation has made it “a popular destination” for commercial and 
altruistic surrogacy. Id. at 2271–72. 
 47. See Hospital Plans to Offer First Uterus Transplant, NBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 15, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16637583/ns/health-womens_health/t/hospital-plans-offer-
first-uterus-transplant/#.UE_5tmie7cY; Fiona Macrae, Britain’s First Womb Transplant 
Could Be Carried Out in Just Two Years, MAIL ONLINE (July 12, 2012), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2172420/Britain-s-womb-transplant-carried-just-TWO-
YEARS.html. 
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II. PENALIZING SINGLETONS AND COHABITANTS—THE MARRIAGE REQUIREMENT 
Despite the general American reticence toward recognizing and enforcing 
gestational surrogacy arrangements, some states have taken steps to affirm some 
surrogacy.48 Both Florida and Louisiana have statutes appearing to do just that.49 
Florida’s surrogacy legislation, passed in 1993,50 allows both traditional and 
gestational surrogacy. Oddly, Florida law allows even unmarried couples to use 
traditional surrogacy.51 Gestational surrogacy agreements, on the other hand, are 
only permitted under Florida law when the intended parents are “legally married.”52 
Louisiana’s rules are even odder. First, it is unclear whether gestational 
surrogacy is permissible in Louisiana at all. The only state statute directly 
addressing surrogacy is Louisiana Revised Statute section 9:2713, which provides 
that: 
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be 
absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to 
public policy. 
 
B. “Contract for surrogate motherhood” means any agreement whereby 
a person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable 
consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, 
and then to relinquish to the contributor of the sperm the custody and 
all rights and obligations to the child.53 
This statute arguably prohibits all surrogacy in Louisiana. However, it was passed 
immediately in the wake of Baby M, when the country was outraged over the 
possibility that Mary Beth Whitehead might lose custody of her genetic child 
because of an agreement she made to act as a surrogate. The statute sought to 
prevent a Baby M-style debacle from occurring in Louisiana. Its terms, however, 
are limited to banning compensated surrogacies involving insemination,54 a process 
that only traditional surrogacy arrangements utilize.55 The statute may not speak at 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2005) (prohibiting “the 
formation of a surrogate parentage contract . . . for compensation”); see also Mortazavi, 
supra note 2, at 2258–62 (classifying states that permit, regulate, or ban “commercial” and/or 
“altruistic” surrogacy contracts). 
 49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2010) (establishing that Florida sanctions only 
altruistic surrogacy agreements); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005); see also infra notes 
54–56 and accompanying text (explaining the apparent discrepancy between the Louisiana 
statute’s plain language and its interpretation). 
 50. See Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 93–237, 1993 Fla. Laws 2405. 
 51. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West 2012) (permitting “preplanned adoption 
agreements” which constitute a “transfer of custody of a child” and also a “consent of a 
mother to place her biological child for adoption” utilizing whatever “fertility technique” is 
specified in the agreement without a requirement of marriage of the resulting parents). 
 52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15. 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for 
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all to gestational surrogacy, wherein IVF technology, not insemination, is used.56 
Indeed, that technology was virtually unknown at the time of the Louisiana 
statute’s 1987 passage, largely because the first successful IVF procedure in this 
country was conducted in 1981.57 Further bolstering the interpretation that section 
9:2713 prohibits only traditional surrogacy in Louisiana are a couple of well-hidden 
statutes in the vital statistics area of Louisiana legislation, which provide that if a 
“husband and wife, joined by legal marriage recognized as valid” agree with a 
relative by blood or affinity for that relative to act as a surrogate, the married 
couple/intended parents will be listed as the child’s parents on the birth 
certificate.58 The statute does not directly provide that gestational surrogacy 
agreements are enforceable in Louisiana, nor does anything else in Louisiana law, 
but it is certainly some indication that these arrangements are not viewed in the 
same abhorrent manner as are traditional surrogacy agreements.59 
Importantly, to the extent Florida and Louisiana sanction surrogacy agreements 
at all, they sanction them only for married intended parents.60 Unmarried intended 
parents may be able to conceive and deliver a child naturally, but the use of a 
surrogate is unavailable based solely on marital status. This form of discrimination 
cannot pass constitutional muster, even on a relatively sparse background of 
successful challenges to marital status-based discrimination. 
III. THE STANDARD OF SCRUTINY SUBTERFUGE 
Much like the debates that rage on over the constitutionality of bans on same-
sex marriage, discussions about the constitutionality of surrogacy limitations are 
frequently unfocused and unproductive because those debating cannot come to 
common ground about a basic, threshold issue: What level of scrutiny applies when 
assessing whether surrogacy limitations meet constitutional muster? It is nearly 
axiomatic at this point that governmental infringement upon the right to procreate 
must satisfy standards of strict scrutiny.61 The U.S. Supreme Court held as early as 
the 1940s that the right to procreate—or, more specifically, the right to liberty in 
making procreative decisions—is a fundamental right.62 Fundamental rights require 
that the government tread lightly, infringing upon personal autonomy only where 
necessary.63 It would seem, then, that as surrogacy statutes necessarily relate to 
                                                                                                                 
Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353, 360–61 (2011) (distinguishing and 
elaborating on the differences between traditional and gestational surrogacy); Catherine 
DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 
147, 149 (2000). 
 56. See Dana, supra note 55, at 360–62. 
 57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(B)(1)(a)(viii) (2012) (recognizing the intended parents 
of a child born through surrogacy to be the parents for purposes of the birth certificate); id. 
§ 40:32 (requiring that those intended parents be married). 
 59. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:34. 
 60. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:32, 
34(B)(1)(a)(viii). 
 61. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam) 
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human procreation, they must be viewed through the lens of heightened scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, however, the question is far from settled. 
The difficulty boils down to whether the fundamental right of freedom in 
procreative decision making is limited to traditional coital reproduction, or whether 
it extends to include procreation through more modern technological means, some 
of which require collaborators in the reproductive process. Scholars have staked out 
positions in favor of a narrow view of what liberty in procreation means, an 
exceptionally expansive one, and even an intermediate approach.64 Because the 
U.S. Supreme Court has yet to elaborate on the contours of freedom in procreation 
in a case involving ART, the issue is far from settled, and debate rages on. 
A. Answering the Unanswered Question: Is Access to ART a Constitutionally 
Protected Right? 
Those who advocate a narrow view of the right to freedom in reproductive 
decision making rest largely on the notion that fundamental rights include only 
those that are deeply rooted in tradition and history and that ART, of course, is not 
so rooted.65 Focusing on gestational surrogacy specifically, the IVF technique on 
which it relies has been in existence for about forty years and has been relatively 
reliable for an even shorter period.66 Further, some argue that Supreme Court 
precedent protecting reproductive autonomy actually protects that autonomy only 
when it implicates concerns about bodily integrity.67 Viewed in this manner, Roe v. 
Wade68 protects the right to choose abortion only because a woman cannot be 
coerced to use her body to carry a child to term.69 Carey v. Population Services 
International70 protects the right to use contraception for the same reasons.71 And 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson72 protects against forced sterilization only 
because it would involve an affirmative intrusion upon the body.73 Moreover, 
proponents of this narrow interpretation view rights to reproductive autonomy as 
negative rights rather than positive ones.74 Viewed through such a lens, the 
                                                                                                                 
(“[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification . . . [when 
it] interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage 
of a suspect class.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 64. See infra Part III.A. 
 65. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1165–67 (2008). 
 66. See Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 36; see also DAAR, 
supra note 9, at 36 (dating the first successful birth following in vitro fertilization to 1978); 
Sullivan, supra note 36. 
 67. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1464–67 (2008). 
 68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 69. See Rao, supra note 67, at 1464–65. 
 70. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 71. See Rao, supra note 67, at 1464–65 (describing the Supreme Court’s contraception 
cases as “provid[ing] only a limited right to prevent conception,” entangled with “concerns 
about bodily integrity and inequality”). 
 72. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 73. See Rao, supra note 67, at 1464–65. 
 74. See, e.g., Meilaender, supra note 11, at 180. 
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government may not be permitted to restrain individuals in their exercise of 
reproductive rights, but it is “under no obligation to provide the services or 
resources that would make such exercise possible.”75 Some might argue that the 
recognition of surrogacy contracts is one such “service” that a state may legally 
withhold.76 For these scholars, then, the right to reproductive autonomy that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized is an exceptionally narrow one. 
Some advocate an equally extreme, yet wholly expansive, view of the right to 
liberty in procreation.77 Emphasizing the “centrality of reproduction to personal 
identity, meaning, and dignity,”78 these scholars argue that if the constitutional right 
to liberty in the procreative process means anything, it means that individuals’ 
decisions to “have and rear offspring” must be protected.79 For that right to function 
in a developing society, it too must be reinterpreted in light of modern reproductive 
possibilities and limitations.80 If individuals are naturally limited by infertility, and 
“if there is an available medical procedure that will ‘cure,’ or at least alleviate, [it],” 
then a “couple’s right to access that procedure” has been described as robust 
enough to include “a right to access any other medical treatment which would 
allow for an ability to live a full life.”81 For some, then, the Constitution protects 
nearly all forms of reproduction, including use of the IVF technology needed to 
accomplish genetic surrogacy and even more aggressive uses of reproductive 
technology.82 
Finally, at least one scholar has articulated a position in between these two 
extremes. Radhika Rao has argued that the constitutionally protected right to 
procreate does not encompass new, nonhistorically rooted, and artificial forms of 
reproduction such as those involving the use of IVF.83 In other words, she argues 
that there is no protected right to use ART.84 Nonetheless, Rao maintains that the 
government must regulate in a manner that gives all persons “an equal right[] [to 
access ART], even if no one retains an absolute right.”85 For Rao, then, ART 
regulation comes down to a question of whether a governing authority acts 
evenhandedly.86 Thus, restrictions on access to ART may be permissible and may 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 178–79; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 22–42. 
 78. ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 30. 
 79. Id. at 126. 
 80. See generally Gregory Dolin, Dorothy E. Roberts, Lina M. Rodriguez & Teresa K. 
Woodruff, Medical Hope, Legal Pitfalls: Potential Legal Issues in the Emerging Field of 
Oncofertility, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 676–80 (2009) (describing cases and other 
American authorities implying, but not explicitly recognizing, a right to reproduce that 
extends to the use of ART). 
 81. Gregory Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J. 1203, 
1220 (2009). 
 82. See Rao, supra note 67, at 1459 (explaining that some scholars view preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis of embryos and cloning as potentially protected reproductive activities). 
 83. Id. at 1462–68. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1460 (emphasis omitted). 
 86. Id. at 1489. 
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likewise be unconstitutional, depending on whether they draw lines between 
classes.87 
B. Standards of Scrutiny in the Face of Uncertainty 
The coming of the recognition of a fundamental right that extends beyond coitus 
and into reproductive technologies like surrogacy may well be imminent. In one of 
the most recent pronouncements on the matter, a federal district court in Utah held 
that a couple’s “singular opportunity to procreate through gestational surrogacy 
necessarily implicates their fundamental right to bear children, thereby invoking the 
protections of the U.S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution.”88 Still, this Article 
does not seek to solve the long-mystifying question as to whether access to ART 
holds a place among the constitutionally protected procreative liberties. Rather, I 
argue that the standard does not matter. Legislation that discriminates among 
unmarried individuals, effectively denying them a right to use surrogates in the 
reproductive process, is likely unconstitutional even if the inclusion of surrogacy 
and other forms of ART among constitutionally protected rights is ultimately 
rejected. In the marital status discrimination context, scholars have overfocused on 
the status of ART as protected, largely ignoring that the question may well not be 
determinative of the constitutionality of the legislation at hand. 
Much has changed in the reproductive technology arena since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird.89 Nonetheless, this seminal case on 
marriage-based discrimination provides a number of important insights for 
surrogacy, although it was decided well before surrogacy became controversial in 
the United States. In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute 
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives for the purpose of preventing 
pregnancy to unmarried persons only; distribution could be freely made to married 
persons under the statute.90 In so ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the 
Constitution does not deprive a state of the ability to treat different categories of 
persons differently.91 But when a state statute places persons in different classes, 
the Constitution does deny that state “the power to legislate that different treatment 
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of 
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.”92 There must be a rational 
relationship between the classification’s differing treatment and the objective of the 
statute.93 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1274 (D. Utah 2002) (citing Marsha Garrison, 
Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal 
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 856 (2000)); see also DeLair, supra note 55, at 181; 
Terrence Theophilus Griffin, Note, Surrogacy Agreements: Permitting Americans to 
Structure Work and Home, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1063, 1078–81 (2007). 
 89. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 90. Id. at 440–43. 
 91. Id. at 447. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
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The protection Eisenstadt affords may appear to provide little comfort. In the 
surrogacy context, there is little doubt that the bar to upholding surrogacy 
legislation in the face of an equal protection attack has been set especially low. One 
scholar, Richard F. Storrow, has even suggested that “discrimination on the basis of 
marital status is likely to survive low-level rational basis scrutiny in many 
contexts,” and that “‘an uncommonly silly law’ might have a rational basis.”94 
Nonetheless, equal protection does pose an obstacle;95 even proffering a rational 
basis for marital status discrimination in light of the importance of procreative 
liberty in American jurisprudence may simply be too high a burden for states to 
shoulder should surrogacy statutes come under constitutional attack. Moreover, 
“society’s commitment to equal treatment and interpretivism’s commitment to 
consistency in the law” require more.96 
Storrow’s concerns about the likelihood of much marital status discrimination 
surviving strict scrutiny are legitimate but are unlikely to prove worrisome in the 
surrogacy context specifically. Surrogacy bears upon one of the most significant 
civil liberties afforded mankind.97 But even if there is no fundamental right to 
access surrogacy as a means of reproducing, and thus heightened scrutiny is not 
triggered,98 marital status discrimination likely fails to survive even a rational basis 
review. 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST THE LEGALITY OF MARITAL STATUS-BASED 
DISCRIMINATION 
To survive any level of constitutional scrutiny, states banning unmarried persons 
from accessing surrogacy must legitimate their bans by articulating the state 
interest in restricting the use of surrogacy. Because few constitutional challenges to 
surrogacy have been lodged to date, states’ articulated interests in other statutes 
limiting rights in the procreative context prove particularly instructive. Eisenstadt 
v. Baird,99 one of the first cases requiring a state to articulate its reasons for 
procreative regulation, provides a helpful starting point in examining frequently 
advanced state interests. 
In Eisenstadt, the State of Massachusetts proffered a number of different 
possibilities as to its interest in the Massachusetts contraception statute, and it is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case 
Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 305, 330 (2006). 
 95. See Jamie L. Zuckerman, Extreme Makeover—Surrogacy Edition: Reassessing the 
Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the Right to Revoke Consent 
in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REV. 661, 677 (2008) (“[B]eing born into 
a two-parent traditional family certainly does not guarantee that the child will grow up in 
that environment.” (citing Massie, supra note 1, at 511)). 
 96. Storrow, supra note 94, at 330. 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
 98. When a fundamental right is at issue, rational relationship review is jettisoned in 
favor of a requirement that legislation withstand strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curium). 
 99. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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rather clear that the majority thought it impossible to guess at the true legislative 
intent.100 Nevertheless, articulated possibilities include that the Massachusetts 
legislature sought to “protect purity” and “preserve chastity” with a statute limiting 
the use of contraceptives to married persons—that its aim was essentially to 
discourage premarital sex.101 The Court quickly dismissed this proffered purpose, 
both because the Court believed it highly unlikely that the Massachusetts 
legislature sought to punish premarital sex with pregnancy and because, even if the 
legislature did, such a justification would not withstand even rational basis review 
because the same statute allowed unmarried persons to receive contraceptives to 
prevent disease (rather than pregnancy).102 As a result, a ban of the distribution of 
contraceptives solely to single persons could hardly be said to be reasonably tied to 
any desire to discourage premarital sex.103 
The State next sought to save its statute by maintaining that its purpose was to 
protect the public health by limiting distribution of medical products—“potentially 
harmful articles.”104 Noting that the statute was placed in a section of the 
Massachusetts Criminal Code titled “Crimes Against Chastity, Morality, Decency 
and Good Order,”105 the majority found it almost laughable that the State would 
attempt to claim “an interest in health.”106 Moreover, even “[i]f health were the 
rationale of [the statute], the statute would be both discriminatory and 
overbroad.”107 If contraceptives needed to be regulated for health reasons, then that 
need existed for married and unmarried persons alike.108 
Finally, the Court considered whether the statute might be upheld as a simple 
contraceptive ban and whether a state essentially declaring contraceptives 
“immoral” was permissible.109 Punting on the question of whether a state has the 
right to legislate morality in this manner, the Court held that the legislature must 
afford the same protection against the societal ills of contraception to both married 
and unmarried persons alike.110 
None of the State’s proffered objectives, then, survived an equal protection 
challenge. Even under the rational basis review employed in Eisenstadt, the State’s 
attempt to discriminate based solely on marital status failed.111 Eisenstadt is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See id. at 447–53. 
 101. See id. at 447–49. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 449 (“[T]he Massachusetts statute is thus so riddled with exceptions that 
deterrence of premarital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its aim.”). 
 104. Id. at 450. 
 105. Id. (quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (1st Cir. 1970) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 106. Id. (quoting Baird, 429 F.2d at 1401). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (stating that the “need is as great for unmarried persons as for married persons”) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Mass. 1969) (Whittemore & Cutter, 
JJ., dissenting in part)). 
 109. Id. at 452 (quoting Baird, 429 F.2d at 1402). 
 110. Id. at 453 (“[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may 
be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”). 
 111. Id. at 447 (“The question for our determination in this case is whether there is some 
ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and 
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particularly instructive in the surrogacy context, not only because it relates to 
family creation and the right to either create or prevent parenthood, but also 
because states’ objectives are just as dubious under the surrogacy statutes, which 
treat persons differently based on marital status. 
Neither Florida nor Louisiana’s preserved legislative history documents provide 
any insight as to the purpose of the marriage requirement in either state’s laws.112 
Nonetheless, one can arrive at a number of persuasive possibilities with relative 
ease. Indeed, many of them mirror those articulated in Eisenstadt and other 
procreative right cases. 
A. Sex and Morality 
It cannot be persuasively argued that either Florida or Louisiana prohibits 
unmarried couples from entering into gestational surrogacy agreements because 
those states view “sexual activity outside of marriage [as] corrosive of the social 
fabric.”113 Such a view relies on the notion that sexual desires should be expressed 
only within the confines of marriage because of its procreative effects.114 The very 
existence of surrogacy statutes, however, assumes that marriage and procreation 
through sexual intercourse do not necessarily come hand in hand.115 Essentially, 
family creation through surrogacy has nothing to do with sex. As a result, 
channeling sexual activity in marriage is not a legislative aim that can support 
discriminatory surrogacy statutes. 
B. Physical and Mental Health 
Also, as the State did in Eisenstadt, Florida and Louisiana may offer a health 
justification in support of their discriminatory legislation. Pregnancy involves risks 
to the physical health of the woman giving birth116—risks that, in the case of a 
surrogate, are attributable solely to her agreement to act as a surrogate and to carry 
                                                                                                                 
unmarried persons under [the statute in question].” (emphasis added)). 
 112. See Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 93-237, 1993 Fla. Laws 2405; Act of Sept. 1, 1987, 
1987 La. Acts 1433. 
 113. Storrow, supra note 94, at 319. 
 114. See id. at 318 (“Marriage has been an important component of social systems 
worldwide for millennia. Its value to contemporary American society is primarily as a 
socially sanctioned locus for sexual activity, procreation, and support for children.”). 
 115. See id. at 319. 
 116. Health Problems in Pregnancy, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/healthproblemsinpregnancy.html; Pregnancy Complications, WOMENSHEALTH
.GOV, http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-pregnant/pregnancy-complications
.cfm. 
2013] DISCRIMINATION IN SURROGACY 1201 
 
a child to term.117 Thus, the argument goes, sanctioning surrogacy might encourage 
women to cavalierly approach such risky behavior.118 
More persuasively, surrogacy arrangements almost without doubt lead to some 
psychological trauma, likely for the woman acting as a surrogate, the intended 
parents, and, eventually, even the child born through surrogacy.119 Baby M 
certainly demonstrated as much. The intended parents and surrogate in that case 
fought a bitter custody battle that spanned the Eastern Seaboard.120 The surrogate, 
Mary Beth Whitehead, appeared on television in iconic images with a tear-soaked 
face, mascara running down her cheeks, begging a judge not to enforce the 
surrogacy contract she signed.121 After the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
surrogacy agreements to be void as against public policy,122 Baby M herself felt it 
necessary to take action, as an adult, to create a familial link to her intended mother 
through adoption.123 For all of the players involved then, surrogacy has significant 
psychological impacts. Baby M involved a traditional surrogacy arrangement. The 
detrimental mental health impact for both the surrogate and the child are likely 
diminished when a gestational surrogacy goes awry.124 Nonetheless, no one would 
seriously argue that the possibility of emotional trauma is entirely eliminated 
merely because the surrogate is not genetically related to the child she carries. The 
possibility of both the physical and emotional trauma to the surrogate, intended 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN 
AMERICA 17–24 (2010) (discussing the short- and long-term risks to women who act as 
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pregnant); cf. Surrogate Pregnancy, INTENDED PARENTS, INC., http://intendedparents.com/
Info/Surrogate_Pregnancy.asp (noting that gestational surrogacy “presents less risk for 
intended parents”). 
 118. See Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for 
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2361–67 (1995); Horsburgh, supra note 38, at 
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 119. See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also Karen Busby & 
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on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 17 (2010) (describing feminist arguments that 
surrogates cannot possibly anticipate “the full potential of the traumas they could experience 
upon surrender of the child”). 
 120. See  Robert Hanley, At the Baby M Visitation Hearing, Bitter and Anguished 
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 121. See Acker, supra note 20; Leighton Mark, Surrogate Mother Mary Beth Whitehead 
Testifying at Hearing (photograph), available at http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-
photo/rights-managed/U87336030-29/surrogate-mother-mary-beth-whitehead-testifying-at?
popup=1 (1987); see also Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236–37 (stating that Mary Beth Whitehead 
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 122. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. 
 123. Weiss, supra note 120, at 72. 
 124. See, e.g., R.J. Edelmann, Surrogacy: The Psychological Issues, 22 J. REPROD. & 
INFANT PSYCHOL. 123, 125 (2004) (noting that traditional surrogates may have increased 
mental health risks because of the genetic link to the child and because traditional surrogates 
are less likely to receive mental health counseling during the surrogacy process). 
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parents, and child, then, may be a justification offered by states restricting the use 
of gestational surrogacy. 
For the same reasons articulated in Eisenstadt, however, a health justification for 
discriminatory surrogacy legislation likely cannot withstand even rational basis 
review. The Florida provision is found in the midst of a relatively lengthy act 
permitting and promising enforcement of surrogacy agreements.125 The placement 
of the requirement limiting the use of surrogacy services to married intended 
parents militates strongly against the notion that it has anything to do with health.126 
The Louisiana statute is in the Vital Statistics portion of the Louisiana Revised 
Statutes, which regulate the information to be included on Louisiana birth 
certificates.127 Birth certificates are, of course, largely about protecting public 
health,128 and so the argument for a health purpose for this statute is facially 
stronger than it was in Eisenstadt. Still, a health purpose cannot save either statute. 
They both sanction the use of gestational surrogacy arrangements, wholly accepting 
the notion that the benefits of surrogacy as an alternative to traditional means of 
creating a family outweigh the inherent risks to the surrogate, the intended parents, 
and the child. The trouble, of course, is that the statutes sanction the use of 
surrogacy only when the intended parents are married.129 And much like in 
Eisenstadt, that classification and differing treatment cannot be said to bear in any 
way on protecting health. If surrogacy has a significantly detrimental impact on the 
participants thereto, then it must be banned as a family-creating alternative 
altogether.130 Allowing and enforcing its use for only some families dependent 
upon marital status, however, is unconstitutional. 
Moreover, a marriage requirement for intended parents cannot be said to even 
approach the accomplishment of any health purpose. Requiring marriage for the 
intended parents is not likely to impact the surrogate’s health.131 Whatever physical 
and emotional effects she will suffer from carrying a child to term and then 
relinquishing the child as required by a gestational surrogacy agreement are likely 
to be suffered regardless of the marital status of the intended parents.132 The same 
goes for the intended parents themselves—the joys and traumas they experience as 
a result of the surrogacy process are likely to be wrapped up in many things, but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. See Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 93–237, 1993 Fla. Laws 2405. 
 126. The marriage requirement for surrogacy is codified in Title 43 Domestic Relations 
and Chapter 742 Determination of Parentage. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2010). 
 127. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:33 (2012) (establishing the registry for, among other 
things, “the safety and preservation of all vital records covering the births, deaths, [and] 
marriages . . . made and received under this Chapter”); see also id. § 40:34(B) (enumerating 
the contents of a birth certificate). 
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their own marital status is not one of them.133 Even with respect to the eventual 
child, any harm suffered as a result of the creation and enforcement of a surrogacy 
contract will no doubt be present regardless of the intended parents’ marital status 
at the time of conception.134 A child of surrogacy may experience feelings of 
confusion and abandonment upon learning that the woman who carried him to term 
relinquished him to be parented by another.135 Those feelings are well known to 
many adoptees and should not be minimized. They are frequently long lasting and 
life affecting.136 Still, they are no doubt far less substantial for children of 
gestational surrogacy, given the lack of genetic connection between the surrogate 
and the resulting child. No genetic bond is present, and the emotional bond created 
between surrogate and child during the pregnancy and delivery is more felt by the 
surrogate than the unborn or newborn resulting child; if such a bond is felt by the 
child at all, it likely fades quickly. There simply is no sociological evidence to 
support an assertion that a voluntary arrangement made by a loving intended parent 
with a woman who volunteers surrogacy services has any long-lasting impact on 
the resulting child. Further, even if it were proven that children born as a result of 
surrogacy agreements suffer emotionally throughout their lives, that harm would 
flow to all children of surrogacy, regardless of their intended parents’ marital 
status. Children are unlikely to know or care much about their parents’ marital 
status at the time of their creation. Arguments in favor of requiring intended parents 
to be married to protect the resulting children of surrogacy simply fall short of their 
mark. 
Health justifications for marriage-based discrimination in surrogacy simply 
cannot withstand even low-level constitutional scrutiny. The discriminatory 
restrictions on access are not rationally related to protecting the physical or mental 
health of any of the parties involved. 
C. Dual-Parent Child Rearing and Child Support 
One might argue that requiring intended parents utilizing surrogacy to be 
married ensures that the resulting child will be both raised and financially 
supported by two adults. And in most states, of course, those adults could only be a 
man and a woman. Conservatives would likely argue then, as they do in the same-
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sex marriage context, that requiring the intended parents to marry is the only way to 
ensure that the child will be raised by a man and a woman.137 Although no state has 
so argued in a judicial surrogacy dispute thus far, scholars have proffered the 
additional possibility that a state may attempt to justify a limitation on the use of 
surrogacy to married intended parents by arguing that it is the only way to ensure 
that there are two adults bound for a child’s support.138 The problem, of course, is 
that requiring the intended parents to be married at the time the parties embark 
upon surrogacy does not, in fact, ensure the child’s continued support or care by 
two parents. 
With regard to care, requiring the initial marriage of the intended parents most 
certainly does not ensure the child’s future in that precise family dynamic. Indeed, 
to suggest that requiring marriage at the outset of a surrogacy arrangement is even 
rationally related to ensuring the child a two-parent upbringing is a difficult 
argument to make given today’s reality. No child is ensured a two-parent 
upbringing, and, with a divorce rate looming around fifty percent,139 there is little to 
no evidence that marriage contributes to a couple’s longevity.140 Moreover, to the 
extent a state seeks to use the marriage requirement to embed both a man and a 
woman in the child’s life permanently, rather than allowing less traditional families 
to parent a child through surrogacy, it may have an uphill battle. The debate as to 
the success of children raised in nontraditional family structures continues in the 
same-sex marriage context.141 Perhaps all that can intelligently be said about the 
conflicting, and often partisan, studies published to this point is that there is 
insufficient evidence to show, one way or another, what family form is “best” for 
children. As a result, a marriage limitation in surrogacy cannot be proffered as a 
justification that bears any rational relationship to providing a permanent, positive, 
two-parent upbringing for children. 
Requiring marriage to force the resulting child’s support on not one, but two, 
individuals is a stronger purported rationale for a marriage requirement in 
surrogacy, but it is still not one that can survive an equal protection analysis.142 
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Already, state law will provide a parent for a child resulting from surrogacy and 
will often provide two parents—namely, the woman who gives birth (the surrogate) 
and, if she is married, her husband.143 Of course, that result is exactly what 
surrogacy statutes seek to avoid; in sanctioning surrogacy arrangements, the law 
typically seeks to shift responsibility for support of the child from the historical, 
traditional parents—the woman who gives birth and her husband—to the intended 
parents.144 “The aim of surrogacy legislation is not to identify the parties 
responsible for a child in the first instance[,]”145 but to place the responsibility for 
support of the child on the person or persons to whom the child has a genetic link. 
There really is no serious risk, then, that a child born of surrogacy will have no 
legal parent to whom to look for support.146 And while in theory more parents, and 
thus more hands to look to for support, could only help a child, that position has 
failed to gain any sway in many other parentage contexts. Dual paternity, for 
instance, in which the law establishes the parent-child link and imposes a support 
obligation on multiple men with biological or other legal connections to a child, has 
been rejected in all but one state.147 Moreover, single parent adoptions are now 
legal in all fifty states,148 further undermining the notion that the state acts 
stridently to ensure a child two parents for financial support. Thus, where the law 
could attempt more intrusive means of ensuring a multiplicity of parents to provide 
support in other contexts, it has been intentionally constructed not to do so. 
Surrogacy legislation stands alone in attempting to ensure a child’s adequate 
support by assuming that marriage is the only vehicle through which that might be 
done. The approach is inconsistent with the policies underlying child support 
doctrines in other contexts, is inequitable because it prevents single persons and 
unmarried couples from utilizing a significant method of family creation, and is 
violative of equal protection because it is not rationally related to its objective. 
Marital status-based limitations on access to surrogacy simply fail to survive 
even rational basis review. In the way of a shift in the tide toward greater 
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acceptance of the possibility of ART as encompassed within the domain of 
constitutionally protected fundamental procreative rights, marital status-based 
limitations should almost certainly fall. 
CONCLUSION 
Multiple justifications for limiting the use of reproductive technologies are 
offered by states in defense of discriminating against those who have not chosen 
marriage before becoming parents. And discriminatory treatment under the law is 
occasionally permissible. But it is time that the American states recognize that “a 
law limiting [surrogacy] to married persons . . . should fail because it [treats] the 
very same act—the use of a particular technology—differently based upon the 
marital status or sexual preference of the persons involved, with no real basis for 
the distinction other than societal disapproval or prejudice.”149 Limitations of or a 
wholesale rejection of surrogacy as a family-creating device based on disapproval 
and prejudice, rather than any legitimate risk of harm to third parties or the 
resulting children themselves, is constitutionally unsound. That surrogacy is newer, 
less understood, and therefore naturally viewed more skeptically than other 
methods of family formation, including adoption, is not a sufficient basis for 
assuming that it presents any more flaws or risks than the more well-known and 
well-used procreative methods. In the absence of any evidence that requiring the 
marriage of intended parents protects traditional coital reproduction, the physical or 
mental health of any of the parties involved, or even facilitates the collection of 
child support from multiple parents, we must begin to escape the crippling fear150 
of assisted reproduction that leads us to unequal, discriminatory, and 
unconstitutional treatment of those wishing to build families. 
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